Category Archives: whistleblower

Senate Bill Would Increase SEC Penalties To $1 Million And Up

Under a Senate bill, the SEC would be able to administratively impose a maximum $1 million per violation penalty on individuals and a maximum $10 million per violation penalty on financial firms for the most serious (e.g., fraud, deceit) violations.  The current levels are substantially lower — at $181,071 for individuals and $905,353 for firms — though the SEC is empowered to go to federal court to get the equivalent of the ill-gotten gains in a given case.

Under the proposed measure, the SEC would not have to go to federal court to get large remedies, though the total remedy per violation would be capped – the maximum penalty for an individual could not exceed, for each violation, the greater of (i) $1 million, (ii) three times the gross pecuniary gain, or (iii) the losses incurred by victims as a result of the violation.  The maximum amount that could be obtained from entities could not exceed, for each violation, the greater of (i) $10 million, (ii) three times the gross pecuniary gain, or (iii) the losses incurred by victims as a result of the violation.

In addition, individuals and firms that were found civilly or criminally liable for securities law violations in the 5 years leading up to a new violation could face up to three times the new caps, e.g., penalties of $3 million/$30 million.

It is important to note that SEC administrative or “in-house” courts have faced substantial constitutional challenges recently and are often considered subject to agency bias.  At a minimum, it is clear that the SEC courts lack some of the procedural safeguards provided in federal court.  If the Senate bill becomes law, the SEC will have significantly increased leverage in negotiations with respondents not only because of the amounts involved but because the Enforcement staff would not need to go to federal court to get such amounts.

 

 

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Trump Administration May Suspend DOL Fiduciary Rule

The DOL Fiduciary Rule, effective April 2017, is among the items that the new administration may put on hold upon taking office in January 2017. Once effective, the Rule makes all financial advisers providing rollover and other advice to retirement investors “fiduciaries” required to put retail customers’ interests before the advisers’ interests in getting compensated. Broker-dealers, investment advisers, and mutual fund complexes have already sunk millions of dollars into upgrading and changing their compliance and business models in anticipation of the Rule.

At the center of the Rule is the so-called “Best Interest Contract” Exemption or BIC. It permits fiduciaries to enter into prohibited transactions (e.g., accepting commissions in connection with providing rollover and other investment advice) if the financial firm and professional enter into a BIC with the customer, provide certain disclosures, adhere to Impartial Standards of Conduct, charge only “reasonable” compensation, and acknowledge fiduciary status.

Due to its complexity and related compliance costs, some firms have announced that they will not be opening new commissions-based retirement accounts. Others have said that they will continue to open such accounts but will make continuous efforts to review accounts for the appropriateness of commission-based versus fee-based compensation based on a number of factors (e.g., the amount of trading in the account).

The new administration may ask the SEC to step in and issue a unifying rule covering investment advice to retirement accounts. Currently, the SEC’s regime for registered investment advisers under the 1940 Investment Advisers Act provides that investment advisers (who typically charge a percentage of assets under management) are fiduciaries. Such advisers may enter into conflicted transactions if adequate disclosures are made to the customers and if not otherwise prohibited by law.

By contrast, SEC Rules do not impose a fiduciary duty on brokers who provide rollover and other advice to retirement accounts in return for a commission. Brokers charging a commission for transactions are not considered fiduciaries and are instead held to the lesser “suitability” standard.

Regardless of whether the DOL Rule survives, the kinds of changes and industry introspection that have occurred are probably not a complete waste of time and money. FINRA and the SEC are already monitoring investment advisers and broker-dealers for conflicted transactions and policies with respect to compensation. For example, FINRA tends to take a very broad view of whether an investment recommendation, including a rollover recommendation, is “suitable”. Further, the plaintiffs’ litigation bar has long been asserting claims for breach of fiduciary duty in FINRA arbitrations even in the technical absence of such a duty.

Bottom line: regardless of the durability of the DOL Rule, advisers and their firms should continue evaluating their business practices to conform to a “best interests” standard.

For further discussion, here is a recent article from The Hill:

http://thehill.com/policy/finance/305287-financial-adviser-rule-could-be-in-trumps-crosshairs

 

 

 

 

 

 

Whistleblower Rejects $8.25 Million SEC Award

On August 19, 2016, Eric Ben-Artzi, a former Deutsche Bank risk officer, stated he would not accept his portion of a $16.5 million whistleblower award from the SEC because the executives he contends were responsible for overvaluing certain portfolios at the bank were not being personally held accountable in the bank’s settlement with the SEC.  Ben-Artzi had provided information to the SEC, which led to a $55 million fine and settlement in 2015.

Ben-Artzi’s main criticism of the settlement and whistleblower award is that Deutsche Bank shareholders and rank-and-file employees bear the cost of paying such penalties.  He also accused the SEC of having too many connections to the bank through the “revolving door” between government and the industry.  Ben-Artzi noted that his ex-wife and attorneys may have claims on portions of the award.  He also stated that he would accept his portion if he was sure it came out of the pockets of the executives who he claims caused violations of the securities laws.

Here’s a Bloomberg article on the subject:

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-19/deutsche-bank-whistle-blower-spurns-8-million-reward-from-sec

Employers Beware – SEC Charges Company for Stifling Whistleblower Activity

Employers conducting internal investigations often have employees sign agreements requiring them to acknowledge the confidential nature of employee interviews. Less common are agreements that prohibit employees from discussing the interview with anyone outside the company on the pain of possible termination for such disclosure. On April 1, 2015, the SEC found such an agreement, required by a global engineering firm, to violate SEC Rule 21F-17. That Rule, adopted pursuant to Dodd-Frank, prohibits companies from taking, “any action to impede an individual from communicating directly with the [SEC] about a possible securities violation, including … threatening to enforce a confidentiality agreement.”

The firm, KBR Inc., had required witnesses in internal investigations to sign confidentiality statements with language warning that they could face discipline or be fired if they discussed the matters with persons outside KBR. Although there was no evidence that KBR had actually sought to enforce the confidentiality statement, KBR nonetheless agreed to pay a $130,000 penalty and amend its confidentiality statement to make clear that employees may report potential securities violations to the SEC and other federal agencies without fear of retribution.

Bottom line: Companies conducting internal investigations that want to have witnesses acknowledge the confidential nature of interviews should amend their agreements and statements to reflect that employees may report potential violations to the Government without fear of any adverse employment action. In fact, companies seeking to avoid this problem may want to consult the amended language adopted by KBR in the SEC Order –   http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/34-74619.pdf.

SEC Awards Whistleblower-Executive A Half-Million Dollars For “Reporting Out.”

The SEC has doled out over $50 million in awards to 15 individuals since it inaugurated the Dodd-Frank mandated whistleblower program 3 years ago. That program permits whistleblower awards of 10% to 30% of the total money recovered from a securities law violator provided the sanctions exceed $1 million. Whistleblower awards are usually restricted to individuals who provide original information derived from their independent knowledge or analyses. Failure to be deemed an “original” source of information is ordinarily the end of a whistleblower claim.

On March 2, 2015, however, the SEC approved an award of $475,000 to $575,000 to an unnamed executive who merely passed along original information.[1] That award stemmed from a special carve-out designed to incentivize officers and directors to report out where the company fails to take corrective action. Specifically, an executive may be entitled to a whistleblower award if he or she reports information to the SEC 120 days after alerting upper management of the problem. Similarly, if upper management is already aware of the problem at the time the executive learns of it, the executive-whistleblower must wait 120 days before reporting to the SEC.

The rationale for the 120-day rule is two-fold. On the one hand, the SEC wants to protect companies that have robust compliance programs in place and a strong compliance tone from the top. After all, companies who invest in compliance programs and take potential violations seriously should be afforded a safe harbor whereby they are protected from individuals hoping to make a quick buck by passing information along before the 120-day period expires.

On the other hand, the SEC realizes that executives and directors are uniquely placed to take action when upper management will not remedy the problem. Executives regularly receive management and compliance reports and are often the first persons to whom an employee will turn to report an issue. The SEC wants to incentivize such executives to step forward when upper management refuses to take corrective action.

However, an executive considering becoming a whistleblower risks significant reputational and financial harm. Although the whistleblower process is anonymous, upper management at the company may be able to figure out who reported out and may take retaliatory action against that individual.   Or, the individual may have already resigned due to irreconcilable differences with the company. In either case, there is no guarantee of a whistleblower award. Accordingly, executives and directors thinking about “reporting out” should carefully consider the quality of the information they possess and the potential financial and reputational risks.

[1] https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-45.html#.VP79EIHF87M